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AGENCY CONFLICTS, COMPENSATION AND CLIENTELE TYPE,  
AND SURVIVORSHIP BIAS IN BRAZILIAN STOCK FUNDS 
 
Flávio C. Sanematsu 1  




This article investigates the survivorship bias and the behavior of equity mutual funds at 
calendar semester ends in Brazil between 2004 and 2013. Results indicate that fund 
performance is associated with its survivorship, but other factors may play an important 
role in keeping a fund in activity. Results also suggest that the sampled funds present 
positive abnormal returns on the last trading day of calendar semesters, followed by 
negative abnormal returns on the subsequent day. Funds oriented to retail investors and 
those that charge incentive fees are more likely to display these abnormal return behavior. 
There seems to be evidence of portfolio pumping.  





Este artigo investiga o viés de sobrevivência e o comportamento de fundos de investimento 
em ações (FIA) ao final dos semestres do ano calendário no Brasil entre 2004 e 2013. Os 
resultados indicam que o desempenho dos FIA está associado com sua sobrevivência, mas 
que outros fatores podem ter papel importante para manter um FIA em atividade. Os 
resultados também sugerem que os FIA da amostra apresentam retornos anormais 
positivos no último dia de negociações dos semestres do ano calendário, seguidos de 
retornos anormais negativos no dia de negociações seguinte. FIA voltados para clientes de 
varejo e os que cobram taxa de performance apresentam maior probabilidade de exibir 
este padrão de retornos anormais. Parece haver evidência de ‘portfolio pumping’.  
Palavras-chave: conflitos de agência; viés de sobrevivência, ‘portfolio pumping’, fundos de 
investimento em ações, Brasil  
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
This article investigates potential conflicts of interest in actively managed Brazilian 
stock funds. Its data ranges from January 2004 through February 2013. It considers 
discontinued and funds in operation at the end of the sample period to assess the impact 
of survivorship bias. This study discarded very small funds. These are departures from 
Sanematsu (2013) that also studied agency conflicts in Brazilian stock mutual funds.  
Carhart et al. (2002) reveal US evidence that managers may try to inflate fund 
share prices to increase their compensation or attract new capital with an improved 
performance. This fund share price inflation, if carried out with the sole motivation of 
maximizing the wealth of managers, instead of trying to maximize the wealth of investors, 
constitutes a conflict of interest. Investors bear the costs of these deleterious transactions, 
incur a permanent wealth transfer to managers in the form of inflated fees, and may hold 
a portfolio that includes assets that are easier to manipulate instead of more desirable 
qualities. It is possible that managers only resort to these actions when performance has 
been poor.  
Sanematsu (2013) revealed Brazilian evidence about possible stock fund share 
price manipulation through positive abnormal returns on the last day of calendar months, 
especially at the end of calendar semesters, with a reversal on the following day. Fees are 
commonly charged on the last day of calendar periods in Brazil, mainly at the end of 
calendar semesters. Investors look at performance information for the end of calendar 
periods, with a special interest on the previous full calendar year as well as year-to-date 
performances at the end of each calendar month. Thus, these actions, if present, may help 
boost performance in the short-term to possibly attract more capital.   
This study examines abnormal returns at the end of calendar semesters, but 
considers the last trading day of calendar months as well. Even though incentive fees are 
commonly charged at the end of calendar semesters, this study also considers the actual 
dates funds charge incentive fees for the funds that use other dates. Moreover, to assess 
inflation transaction reversals, the days following the last trading days of calendar periods, 
or the days of actual incentive fee charges, are also investigated.  
The analysis herein differentiates funds according to survivorship, clientele, and 
fees. A conjecture is that abnormal returns on the last trading day of calendar periods may 
be more pronounced for discontinued funds because their managers may attempt to 
artificially boost performance and mimic successful funds during the difficult times before 
the fund terminates.  
4 
Clientele types include exclusive and non-exclusive funds. Non-exclusive funds are 
categorized as those that target qualified investors or the general public. The explicit 
consideration of exclusive funds is another departure from Sanematsu (2013). It is 
reasonable to assume that exclusive fund investors are more engaged in monitoring fund 
managers and may replace them more easily. This is probably not so for funds targeting 
the general public. Non-exclusive funds targeting qualified investors are possibly and 
intermediate situation.  
Fee types consist of funds that solely charge management fees, those that charge 
incentive and management fees, and those that do not charge fees (a small portion of the 
sample, mostly exclusive funds). A conjecture is that conflicts of interest, and fund share 
price inflation, could be more severe among funds that charge incentive fees. This study 
also verifies abnormal returns on the end of calendar period for combinations of these 
categories.  
The mark-to-market procedure changed in May 2008 with the introduction of a 
new rule by the Brazilian Securities Commission. Funds used a weighted average price but 
the new rule mandated the use of the closing price. It is possible that evidence of fund 
price share inflation changes in intensity before and after the introduction of the new rule. 
A conjecture is that closing prices may be easier to manipulate and that fund share price 
inflation may be more severe after the introduction of the new rule.  
Results confirm that abnormal returns are frequently positive and significant on the 
last trading day of calendar periods. This is more often observed on the days funds charge 
fees. The evidence also suggests that abnormal returns are frequently negative and 
significant on the days following these last trading days, with a larger absolute value than 
the positive abnormal returns. Thus, investor losses are not negligible. This effect is more 
pronounced for funds that charge incentive fees and target the general public. The 
introduction of the new mark-to-market rule may have accentuated price inflation effects. 
Discontinued funds do not present a behavior pattern remarkably different from surviving 
funds, but their average annual returns are lower, evince that considering survivorship bias 
is important.   
This article continues with a short literature review section, followed by the 
description of the sample, the discussion of the results, and conclusions.  
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2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Survivorship bias 
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996) examined what happens to all funds that existed 
from a specific time onwards. The authors analyze US equity mutual funds in existence in 
1976 and follow their performance until the end of 1993. Funds may remain in operation, 
terminate and return its assets to investors, or be absorbed into another fund. They gather 
that absorbed funds are weak performers.  
Malkiel (1995) used a US sample containing all stock mutual funds in existence 
during the 1971-1991 period. The average fund return was less than that of the main 
stock indices, even when considering returns before all expenses, such as transaction costs 
and management fees. The author also found that funds in continuous operation from 
1982 to 1991 exhibited average annual returns greater than those of all funds that 
operated during the same period. Even so, funds in operation during the whole period 
underperformed the S&P500. Using year-by-year data, Malkiel (1995) found that the 
average annual returns of funds that remained in operation throughout the 1982-1991 
period is statistically greater than those of discontinued funds in the same period.  
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) indicate that an inferior performance relative to the 
S&P500 increases the probability that a fund will cease operations. They analyzed US 
stock mutual funds during the 1976-1988 period and included discontinued fund data in 
their sample. Their evidence conveys that funds in continuous operation throughout the 
whole sample period displayed greater average annual returns than discontinued ones. 
This difference is more accentuated for smaller funds. Thus, they conclude that smaller 
funds with a weak performance are more likely to be discontinued or absorbed into other 
funds. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) also conjecture that weak performance is the main 
fund discontinuation predictor, and add that larger and older funds are less likely to 
terminate. The inflow of new money also reduces the probability that the fund will end, but 
to a lesser extent.  
 
2.2  Conflicts of interest  
Carhart et al. (2002) detected that US equity mutual fund managers execute more 
trades during the last minutes of the trading session at quarter and year-ends in order to 
influence the closing price on these dates. Performance and compensation are calculated 
with these prices. The authors point out that stock funds exhibit very high and economically 
and statistically significant abnormal returns on the final trading day of a quarter and year. 
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Moreover, abnormal returns on the following day are very low, suggesting the reversal of 
inflated returns.    
Carhart et al. (2002) use calendar dummies for the last trading day of each month, 
quarter and year in their sample and also for the corresponding following day as 
explanatory variables. They build equally weighed portfolios of stock funds and the 
dependent variable is their abnormal return. Results indicate that stock fund portfolios 
exhibit price inflation at quarter and year-ends, while this effect is small or non-existent at 
month-ends. They replace abnormal return of the stock fund portfolio with the proportion 
of funds that exhibit a positive abnormal return and reveal that the proportion of funds with 
an abnormal positive return at year-ends is greater than at the end of other quarters, 
indicating that the practice of inflating the stock fund price, especially at the end of the 
year, is very common among US stock mutual funds.  
Portfolio pumping is the practice of trying to inflate the price of assets in which 
funds are already overweight. It differs from window dressing because this later practice 
aims to rid funds of losing stocks and buy winners in order to display an end of the period 
portfolio populated with winners. This would lead to a downward price-pressure on losers 
and an upward pressure on winners. Portfolio pumping creates only an upward price-
pressure, and not necessarily on winning stocks.  
There is evidence of portfolio pumping in the US and Australia. Gallagher et al. 
(2009) assert that institutional fund managers usually buy less liquid and small 
capitalization stocks, in which they are already overweight, on the last day of the quarter. 
These stocks exhibit positive abnormal returns on this day, consequently improving fund 
performance. Carhart et al. (2002) also found signs that some stock funds manipulate the 
price of stocks they already hold. Similarly to Carhart et al. (2002), Gallagher et al. 
(2009) also reveal that the average daily returns of Australian stock funds on the last day 
of the quarter are greater than those of benchmark indices, indicating that these funds 
invest more than the average investor in stocks whose price is inflated on the final trading 
day of the quarter.  
The dynamics of the risk profile of stock fund portfolios during the calendar year 
may also suggest conflicts of interest issues. Huang et al. (2011) analyze the performance 
of US mutual funds that exhibit changes in their levels of risk over time. They compare the 
volatility based on the portfolio positions published at quarter-ends to the realized volatility 
of the stock fund returns. The former would be the volatility of the fund if the manager had 
maintained the positions disclosed at the end of the quarter. The latter is the volatility that 
the investors in the fund actually experienced. Their evidence indicates that these two 
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volatility estimates are different and that fund managers change volatility levels at quarter-
ends.  
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011) survey information regarding price 
manipulation lawsuits in the US and Canada. They conclude that, even though 
manipulation lasts only for a short period of time, prices may move very far from their 
ideal levels, which may have detrimental effects on market participants. Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989) point out that a change in the level of risk assumed by a fund may be 
indicative of agency problems. Risk may change due to ill-motivated trades to increase 
management compensation. Alternatively, managers may be motivated to change the risk 
profile of their portfolios to take advantage of the convex relationship between 
performance and fund flows. Funds that exhibit a superior performance receive 
proportionally larger inflows than those that register an inferior performance. This convex 
relationship may create incentives for managers to increase the risk levels of portfolios in 
order to achieve a superior performance.  
The findings of Huang et al. (2011) indicate that funds change their risk level 
significantly over time and the performance of those that promote more changes is worse 
than those that keep risk levels stable. Thus, investors may obtain larger returns by 
investing in the latter. These authors claim that changes in the risk level of funds are 
probably indicative of agency problems. Brown et al. (1996), in an earlier investigation, 
indicate that "looser" funds, especially the younger ones, increase their risk level in the 
middle of the year. The authors believe that the growth of the mutual fund industry during 
the final period of their sample (1976-1991), allied with the greater scrutiny exercised by 
investors over the past performance of funds, may be responsible for the willingness of 
managers to assume riskier positions when their performance is relatively inferior. Warner 
and Wu (2011) reveal that more mutual fund board independence is associated with fewer 
increases and more reductions in the compensation of managers. A possible way of 
mitigating this problem would be to appoint a larger number of independent directors.  
Castro and Minardi (2009) analyze Brazilian actively and passively managed stock 
mutual funds between January 1996 and October 2006. They examined the returns to 
investors, which are net of fees, and an estimate of gross returns, calculated as the return 
to investors plus the management fee. The authors did not put back incentive fees charged 
by some funds. Even so, their evidence indicates that positive and significant alphas are 
more frequent when they use gross returns instead of net returns to investors and more 
frequent than negative alphas, which was not case when they used net returns to investors. 
The authors conclude that managers appropriate a considerable part of the gains due to 
their superior skills.  
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Sanematsu (2013) analyzes Brazilian stock mutual fund data between 2004 and 
February 2012, but uses a sample that is not free of survivorship bias. He used the 
Carhart et al. (2002) method. The funds exhibit positive abnormal returns at semester-
ends followed by a reversal on the next day. Funds that target qualified investors are less 
likely to exhibit these abnormal returns than those aimed at the general public.  He also 
grouped funds according to charging or not an incentive fee, but the evidence about 
abnormal returns was not as clear as with the type of clientele. The author concludes that 
there is evidence suggesting fund share price manipulation, especially when fees are 
charged. They suggest that there should be stricter rules governing the charge of incentive 
fees in funds targeting the general public. Roquete et al. (2016) applied the same method 
of Sanematsu (2013) to Brazilian multimarket funds, roughly equivalent in many cases to 
US hedge funds, and found similar results for some strategy categories.   
Brazil changed its mark-to-market rule in May 2008. Funds have to use the closing 
price from this date forward, instead of the trade volume weighted average price used until 
then. Sanematsu (2013) affirms that this change may have accentuated the problem of 
abnormal returns at semester-ends. Gallagher et al. (2009) studied changes in the closing 
price methodology at the Australia Securities Exchange (ASX). ASX adopted a discrete 
auction model in February 1997 to determine the closing price due to possible 
manipulations. A new closing price methodology was introduced again in 2001 after new 
allegations of price manipulation. The authors claim that the introduction of auctions 
reduced the possibility of manipulating closing prices because price volatility at market 
closure was decreased. However, the probability of temporarily inflating prices was not 
totally eliminated.  
 
3 – SAMPLE 
 
 
The sample includes stock mutual funds in existence from January 2004 through 
February 2013. The data covers funds still operating in February 2013 and those 
discontinued during the sample period and comes from the Quantum Axis® database. 
Information about discontinued funds was kindly provided for this study. The fund sample 
includes only those classified as actively managed, eliminating sector, private equity, index, 
and exchange traded funds. The sample does not include funds, in operation or 
discontinued, with a track record shorter than 12 contiguous months of returns.    
The same database provides the type of fees and target clientele for funds in 
operation only. Funds are classified in three fee categories: those that charge solely a 
management fee; those that levy management and incentive fees; and those that do not 
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charge a fee. Master funds comprise 75 of the 85 funds that do not charge fees. 
Managers use master funds to receive investments from funds of funds (FoF) or feeder 
funds, which charge fees. The study includes master funds in the sample because fund 
managers use them to trade stocks and abnormal returns may occur. Seven of the 
remaining ten funds that do not charge fees are exclusive funds and the other three target 
institutional investors. The classification according to the type of target clientele is: 
exclusive funds; non-exclusive funds for qualified investors; and non-exclusive funds 
available to the general public. These classifications are based on fund information at the 
time of data collection (April 2013). Sanematsu (2013) did not discern between exclusive 
and non-exclusive funds and between funds that charge and do not charge fees.  
The sample only includes funds with a minimum average value for the daily assets 
under management (AUM) of R$10 million (about US$ 5 million) in at least one of the 
calendar quarters in the sample period. This exclusion eliminated very small funds whose 
behavior may differ from the most representative portion of the Brazilian mutual fund 
industry. This is a departure from Sanematsu (2013), who did not filter out the smaller 
funds. Nonetheless, the sample still covered around 99 percent of the AUM of all initially 
selected funds. The initial sample of 1119 stock funds in operation or discontinued in 
February 2013 decreased to 850 after the minimum AUM filter and finally to 608 funds 
after the application of the contiguous 12 months of returns and active management 
filters.  
Table 1 presents the number of funds and AUM for each year according to the 
survivorship, fee and clientele classifications. The number and the AUM of stock funds 
increased almost seven and nine times, respectively, in the sample period. The number of 
discontinued funds was larger between 2007 and 2010. Contrastingly, the number of 
funds increased more rapidly in this same period, suggesting a dynamic environment in 
the industry in a period of strong economic growth in Brazil (4.6 percent average gross 
domestic product growth between 2007 and 2010 according to World Bank data).  
Forty-two percent of the funds in operation in February 2013 were exclusive, 18 
percent targeted qualified investors but were not exclusive, and 40 percent aimed at the 
general public. The proportion of total AUM of funds for qualified investors seem to have 
increased while it decreased for those targeting the general public and remained about the 
same for exclusive funds. Fifty-two percent of funds charge solely a management fee, 34 
percent also add an incentive fee, and 14 percent do not charge fees. The proportion of 
funds charging solely the management fee is stable in the period, hovering around 54 
percent according to the number of funds, but decreased to about 47 percent according 
to the AUM.  
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Table 1 – Number of stock funds and assets under management (AUM) 
Panel A: According to survivorship  
 
 In operation Discontinued All funds 
Year No. AUM No. AUM No. AUM 
2004 78 10.7 80 4.2 158 14.9 
2005 92 12.5 79 4.6 171 17.1 
2006 116 19.2 79 7.2 195 26.5 
2007 159 37.6 90 10.1 249 47.8 
2008 221 26.6 95 5.6 316 32.2 
2009 310 48.5 89 6.4 399 54.9 
2010 388 63.0 99 7.7 487 70.8 
2011 494 64.7 83 5.2 577 69.9 
2012 585 92.6 20 0.8 605 93.4 
Feb/2013 598 96.3 10 0.3 608 96.5 
 
Panel B: According to clientele, funds in operation in February 2013 
 
 Exclusive Qualified General Public 
Year No. AUM No. AUM No. AUM 
2004 11 5.1 9 0.9 58 4.7 
2005 15 6.4 10 1.3 67 4.8 
2006 26 9.7 14 2.1 76 7.5 
2007 48 15.1 23 5.1 88 17.4 
2008 82 13.7 35 3.8 104 9.1 
2009 126 23.1 46 7.2 138 18.1 
2010 169 29.7 57 12.3 162 21.0 
2011 206 32.3 81 12.9 207 19.5 
2012 244 44.3 103 19.4 238 28.9 
Feb/2013 249 44.7 108 20.1 241 31.5 
 
Panel C: According to compensation fees, funds in operation in February 2013  
 
 Management fee only Management and 
Incentive Fees 
No Fees 
Year No AUM No AUM No AUM 
2004 40 6.0 27 2.6 11 2.2 
2005 49 7.2 32 2.6 11 2.6 
2006 61 11.6 42 3.8 13 3.9 
2007 85 21.9 60 7.6 14 8.1 
2008 125 14.0 77 4.6 19 8.0 
2009 168 25.8 112 9.4 30 13.3 
2010 210 32.8 132 12.0 46 18.2 
2011 262 30.5 165 12.5 67 21.7 
2012 305 44.0 196 17.8 84 30.8 
Feb/2013 310 45.3 203 18.4 85 32.5 
 
Note. The data are for the end of each. AUM are in R$ billion. The table includes only actively managed 
funds with average daily AUM greater than R$ 10 million in any calendar quarter and with a minimum of 12 
contiguous months of returns in the sample period. Exclusive funds are for qualified investors but "qualified" 
funds are not exclusive. Ten of the 608 sampled funds (1.6% of the total) in February 2013 were 
discontinued between February 2013 – the last date considered for the sample period – and April 2013, 
when data was collected.  
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4 – RESULTS 
 
4.1  Survivorship bias  
The survivorship analysis includes all stock mutual funds that were in operation 
during the sample period for at least 12 contiguous months. It does not provide 
information about clientele and fee types because it was no longer available for 
discontinued funds in the Quantum Axis® database. Table 2 shows annualized equally 
and AUM weighted average returns. Malkiel (1995) offer results solely for value weighted 
returns, whereas Brown and Goetzmann (1995) use both. Table 2 also displays average 
annual returns with and without the minimum AUM filter, which excludes the very small 
funds. Table 3 shows statistical tests comparing the average returns achieved by different 
groups of funds in each year.   
Table 2 shows that the average returns for funds in operation at the end of the 
sample period (new and surviving funds) were greater than those of all funds (including 
those discontinued). Interestingly, funds that survived during the entire sample period 
display a smaller equally weighted annualized return than all funds, but this does not 
happen for the value weighted annualized return. This suggests an overestimation of 
performance if discontinued funds are not considered. Moreover, the smaller funds, 
particularly if filter for the very small ones in not applied, contribute to the lower return of 
the survivor group. Only the new and surviving funds generate an average return greater 
than the one registered by the IBrX index.  
Table 2 also suggests that including the funds initiated during the sample period 
increases average returns. This is consistent with Brazilian results in Mendonça Jr., 
Campani, and Leal (2016) and Matos, Pena, and Silva (2015) that associate younger 
funds to greater returns. Malkiel (1995), contrastingly, found that the value weighted 
average annual return of all funds in his US sample was lower than that of funds in 
operation during the whole period studied. It is possible that funds created during the 
sample period in Brazil initiated operations at a favorable economic and stock market 
environment, as pointed out earlier in this article and by Mendonça Jr. et al. (2016) as 
well. Thus, these new funds may be driving the results in Table 2, despite the possible 
negative drag of the smaller funds.  
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Table 2 – Average annual returns  
 
 All funds Survivors New and 
survivors 
Ibovespa IBrX 
Any AUM:      
EW 16.18 15.81 18.57   
VW 17.08 17.05 18.19 13.82 17.66 
Min. AUM      
EW 17.80 16.47 19.62   
VW 17.14 17.07 18.22   
 
Note. Annual percentage returns are expressed in nominal Brazilian currency terms. The sample period 
ranges from January 2004 through February 2013. “All funds” includes operating and discontinued stock 
funds with at least a one-year track record. “Survivors" includes only funds in operation throughout the entire 
sample period. “New and survivors” includes only funds in operation at the end of the sample period with at 
least a one-year track record. The minimum size rule selected funds with AUM greater than R$10 million 
(about US$ 5 million) in at least one quarter during the sample period. Ibovespa and IBrX are two widely 
followed stock indices in Brazil. T-tests comparing results found for the different groups for each year are 
presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 presents average annual returns in each year of the sample period and 
disregards very small funds. Malkiel (1995) finds that the average return of the surviving 
funds is significantly greater than those recorded by non-survivors in all years of his 
sample. Average returns of funds in operation at the end of the sample period (Panel A) 
are greater than those of discontinued funds (Panel B) for every year, except 2008, with 
significance in 6 out of the 9 years. This confirms that the larger annualized returns of 
funds in operation in Table 2 are often significantly larger than discontinued ones. Panel C 
of Table 3 shows a comparison of the average returns of funds that survive until the end of 
the sample period with that of discontinued funds in each year. The average annual 
returns of surviving funds are greater than those of discontinued funds in the following year 
in all years, with the exception of 2008, with significance in 5 out of the 9 years. The 
results in Panel C are similar to those depicted in Panel B, which shows the differences for 
funds discontinued at any moment in time.  
The Brazilian stock fund mortality rates in Table 3 are greater than those in the US 
sample of stock funds in Malkiel (1995). US stock fund mortality rates varied from five to 
18 percent, depending on the year. Panel B of Table 3 shows mortality rates between 14 
and 51 percent after disregarding 2012 because the 2013 data did not cover the whole 
year. The mortality rate of a fund in the year following the period analyzed is 
approximately 9% in Panel C of Table 3. Maybe the more volatile nature of the Brazilian 
stock market and economy induces a greater dynamic in the fund industry.  
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Table 3 – Average annual returns by year and survivorship  
 
Panel A: Survivorship by year 
 All funds New and survivors 
Year Average return No. of funds Average return No. of funds 
2004 30.8 158 36.6 78 
2005 25.9 171 26.3 92 
2006 34.8 195 38.6 116 
2007 40.1 249 42.9 159 
2008 -38.0 316 -40.1 221 
2009 82.5 399 84.7 310 
2010 8.5 487 10.1 388 
2011 -10.8 577 -10.2 494 
2012 17.6 605 17.8 585 
 
Panel B: Funds not surviving until February 2013  
Year Average return No. of funds Mortality rate t-test 
2004 25.0 80 50.6 4.69* 
2005 25.5 79 46.2 0.46 
2006 29.2 79 40.5 4.11* 
2007 35.1 90 36.1 2.56* 
2008 -33.2 95 30.1 -1.76 
2009 74.6 89 22.3 2.80* 
2010 1.9 99 20.3 5.22* 
2011 -14.2 83 14.4 2.97* 
2012 14.3 20 3.3 0.86 
 
Panel C: Funds discontinued in the following year  
Year Average return No. of funds Mortality rate t-test 
2004 20.7 13 8.2 4.24* 
2005 21.5 19 11.1 1.52 
2006 25.1 24 12.3 3.22* 
2007 29.0 28 11.2 3.41* 
2008 -19.9 28 8.9 -1.67 
2009 70.5 11 2.8 1.03 
2010 -1.3 40 8.2 4.56* 
2011 -15.0 69 12.0 3.42* 
2012 14.3 20 3.3 1.21 
 
Note. Average returns in percentage form in nominal Brazilian currency terms. All funds include those with at 
least a one-year track record. New and survivor funds in Panel A includes those that remained in operation 
until the end of the sample period, even if they initiated during it. Funds not surviving until Feb/2013 
includes those that were discontinued after the year under analysis (i.e., 2006 values consider funds 
discontinued as from 2007). Funds discontinued in the following year include only those discontinued in the 
year after the year under analysis (i.e., 2006 values consider only funds discontinued during 2007). Mortality 
rate calculates the proportion of funds discontinued in relation to stock funds in existence in that year. The t-
tests compare the average return of funds that survive until the end of the sample period in Panel A with the 
average return of discontinued funds in Panels B and C. * indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  
14 
4.2  Performance, fees, and clientele  
Table 4 presents average annual returns of funds in operation because there was 
no information available for fees and clientele types for discontinued funds. There is 
virtually no significant difference among fund categories in the table in the 2004 through 
2012 period. The average cumulative return for non-exclusive funds targeting qualified 
investors was 525% and is much higher than that of the other clientele categories. It is not 
surprising that funds that do not charge fees display a much higher cumulative return than 
those that do because reported fund returns are net of fees. The returns of the Ibovespa 
and IBrX indices were 174% and 265%, respectively, during the same period.  
Institutions that specialize in asset management and run most US stock funds are 
usually not associated to commercial banks (MALKIEL, 1995). In Brazil, contrastingly, there 
is a mix of asset managers that are either independent or are associated to large financial 
conglomerates with a commercial bank at its center. Many stock funds targeting the 
general public belong in this category. Mendonça Jr. et al. (2016) indicate that returns 
tend to be lower for funds managed by these latter asset managers, which corresponds to 
the evidence in Table 4, albeit a lack of significance on a year-by-year basis.  
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Table 4 – Average annual returns according the fee and clientele categories  
Panel A: According to the clientele  
 
















(A) - (C) 
2004 42.3 0.1 39.7 0.3 35.0 0.5 
2005 22.0 -1.0 35.4 0.8 25.9 -0.5 
2006 37.9 -0.2 40.9 0.2 38.3 0.0 
2007 39.3 -0.9 55.4 0.8 41.6 -0.3 
2008 -36.4 0.1 -37.6 0.8 -43.8 1.2 
2009 79.8 -0.5 87.4 -0.1 88.2 -0.8 
2010 10.2 -1.4 16.5 1.9 7.8 1.3 
2011 -8.6 0.0 -8.7 1.8 -12.4 2.5* 
2012 16.6 -1.5 21.3 1.1 17.7 -0.5 
2004-12 348 – 525 – 292 – 
 
Panel B: According to fee types  
 Management fee only 
Management and incentive 
















(A) - (C) 
2004 34.7 -0.4 38.6 0.0 38.6 -0.2 
2005 29.1 1.0 22.8 -0.2 24.5 0.5 
2006 36.1 -0.6 41.6 0.1 40.2 -0.3 
2007 40.4 -0.7 46.2 0.1 44.3 -0.3 
2008 -41.1 0.0 -41.0 -1.1 -29.9 -1.2 
2009 81.4 -0.8 90.0 0.3 83.6 -0.1 
2010 8.2 -1.7 11.8 -0.7 14.1 -1.8 
2011 -10.7 0.0 -10.8 -1.9 -6.7 -2.0* 
2012 17.9 0.6 16.6 -1.2 20.5 -0.8 
2004-12 305 – 359 – 476 – 
 
Note. Average returns in percentage form in nominal Brazilian currency terms. Discontinued funds are not 
included in this table because there was no fee and clientele information for them. The 2004-12 value is the 
cumulative average return in the period. The returns of the Ibovespa and IBrX indices were 174% and 265%, 
respectively, in the period. Exclusive funds are for qualified investors but qualified investor funds are not 
exclusive. The t-tests compare the average returns in two table columns, as indicated. * indicates significance 
at the five percent level.  
 
4.3  Abnormal returns and survivorship 
An abnormal daily return is the excess return relative to the Ibovespa stock index, 
which is the main benchmark of the Brazilian stock market. The empirical exercises in this 
section were also carried out for the IBrX index, with no change in conclusions. These 
additional tests are available upon request but are not reported.  
The empirical tests follow the format in Carhart et al. (2002). The abnormal daily 
returns of stock fund portfolios are evaluated on the last day of calendar periods  and on 
the day following it, to assess possible reversals. However, instead of building fund 
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portfolios based on styles, this study forms fund portfolios according to survivorship and 
clientele and fee types. Stock fund portfolios did not include very small AUM funds and are 
equally and AUM value weighted.  
The abnormal daily return is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are 
dummies marking the beginning and end of calendar months or semesters, as described 
in the Appendix. Table 5 displays the results for abnormal returns relative to the Ibovespa 
index for the equally weighted stock fund portfolios. The evidence for the value-weighted 
stock fund portfolios is very similar but important contrasts are highlighted whenever 
necessary. The complete results are available with the authors.  
The first model in Table 5 verifies if the first and last trading day of any month 
exhibit abnormal returns. The second model considers only the first and last trading day of 
a semester, without distinguishing between semesters. The third model distinguishes 
between the first and second semesters, as well as the months that do not coincide with 
semester beginning and end dates. Other models have been tested that distinguished 
between the first and second semesters but did not consider the month dummies, in 
addition to a model that uses a semester variable without making a distinction between the 
first and second plus a month dummy. These models were not presented in Table 5 to 
maintain parsimony. 
The sign of the coefficients on the last day of a calendar period should be positive 
if managers try to inflate fund share prices at this time. The sign of the coefficients of the 
variables marking the beginning of the following calendar period should be negative if 
managers immediately reverse the transactions used to inflate share prices. The results in 
Table 5 indicate that abnormal returns on the day after the period end show statistical 
significance more frequently than those on period end dates. This suggests that there is a 
price reversal after the end of calendar months or semesters. There are a slightly smaller 
number of significant abnormal returns among value weighted fund portfolios, suggesting 
that this may be more frequent with smaller funds. In most cases, the absolute value of the 
coefficient estimated for the dummy marking the period beginning is greater than that of 
the period end, indicating that the strategy of trying to inflate share prices harms investors.  
The number of significant coefficients for discontinued funds (4) is smaller than for 
funds in operation (6), even though the number of significant coefficients for beginning of 
the period dates is the same for the two kinds. The coefficients at the end of periods are 
not significant for discontinued funds and are smaller than those of operating funds. Thus, 
if managers attempt to inflate fund share prices, they seem to have caused more harm to 
investors in discontinued funds. Yet, the behavior of discontinued and operating funds is 
similar.  
17 
The number of significant coefficients for operating exclusive funds (5) is smaller 
than for non-exclusive operating funds targeting either qualified investors (6) or the 
general public (7). These findings indicate that qualified investors, particularly those with 
exclusive funds, may suffer less from agency conflicts than the general public.  
The number of significant coefficients for portfolios of operating funds that charge 
an incentive fee (7) suggests that managers try to inflate their share price at period ends 
because the number of significant coefficients for portfolios of operating funds that charge 
only a management fee (6) and, particularly, no fee (4) are smaller.  
These results are consistent with those in Sanematsu (2013), even though he did 
not compare discontinued and operating funds, did not distinguish among exclusive and 
non-exclusive funds for qualified investors, did not consider funds that do not charge a fee, 
and included very small funds. Survivorship bias is possibly not a problem for the results in 
Sanematsu (2013) and in most of Table 5. Managers of stock funds that charge incentive 
fees or that target the general public may be more prone to fund share price inflation at 
period ends.   
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Table 5 – Models with stock fund portfolio abnormal returns as the dependent variable and 
selected calendar days  
 











































































































































































































R2 (%) 0.86 0.96 0.57 0.54 0.76 1.29 0.74 0.66 0.66 
Note. All variables and definitions of stock fund portfolios in top row in the Appendix. Coefficients are in 
percentage terms, i.e. a 1.0 coefficient represents an abnormal return of 1.0 percent. All stock fund 
portfolios are equally weighed. The value below the coefficients is the t-statistic computed with White robust 
standard errors. Abnormal returns for new and surviving funds relative to the Ibovespa index in the January 
2004 through February 2013 period. * and + indicate significance at the five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for portfolios of funds currently in operation according to 
combinations of fee and clientele types. It suggests that agency conflicts may be more 
frequent in funds that target the general public and also charge an incentive fee because 
they exhibit the largest number of statistically significant abnormal return coefficients. In 
general, the spread between the end of a period and the next day coefficients are larger 
for these kinds of funds. Contrastingly, exclusive funds and those that do not charge fees 
exhibit the lowest number of statistically significant coefficients. Table 6, thus, confirms the 
results in Table 5 and is consistent with those in Sanematsu (2013) with only four 
combinations of fee and clientele types. As a final remark, having a stricter regulation to 
charge incentive fees in funds targeting the general public may protect investors, even 
though it will not eliminate agency problems.   
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Table 6 - Models with stock fund portfolio abnormal returns according to fee type jointly with 
clientele as the dependent variable and selected calendar days  
 
 MAN INC NOFEE 











































































































































































































R2 (%) 0.30 0.68 0.97 0.89 0.81 1.47 0.42 0.20 1.38 
 
Note. All variables and definitions of stock fund portfolios in top two rows in the Appendix. Column 
MAN/EXCL, for example, is an equally weighed portfolio of fund that belong to both the MAN and EXCL 
portfolios, i.e., includes exclusive portfolios that only charge a management fee. The portfolios in the other 
columns follow the same logic. Coefficients are in percentage terms, i.e. a 1.0 coefficient represents an 
abnormal return of 1.0 percent. All stock fund portfolios are equally weighed. The value below the 
coefficients is the t-statistic computed with White robust standard errors. Abnormal returns for new and 
surviving fudns relative to the Ibovespa index in the January 2004 through February 2013 period. * and + 
indicate significance at the five and ten percent levels, respectively.  
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4.4  Influence of mark-to-market regulation change  
The mark-to-market criterion for stock funds changed in May 2008. The new rule 
requires that the value of assets in the fund portfolio shall be determined with the closing 
market price instead of a trading volume-weighted average price. Maybe inflating the 
closing price of stock, particularly less liquid ones, is easier, leading to more fund price 
inflation attempts to improve performance or increase incentive fees.  
A new binary variable is equal to 1 in all days after the rule change and zero 
otherwise. The models in Table 5 were estimated again with the interactions between this 
new variable and the END and BEG dummies. Table 7 portrays the results for two of the 
models in Table 5. The first one includes dummies for the beginning and end of every 
month (BEG and END) plus their interactions with the dummy for the days before and after 
the rule change. The second model distinguishes between the first and second semesters, 
includes dummies for the other months of the year, plus the same interacted variables used 
in the previous model. One of the models in Table 5 was omitted to save space because 
its results were not very different from those of the other two models.   
Table 7 indicates that the evidence in Table 5 changes with the inclusion of the 
interaction variables, even though the conclusions remain the same. The new interacted 
variables are more frequently significant than those originally used in the first model of 
Table 5. The magnitude and signs of the coefficients for the interacted variables are 
consistent with those in Table 5. There are more statistically significant coefficients when 
funds target the general public or charge an incentive fee, similarly to what was reported 
in Tables 5 and 6. The robustness checks performed for the main results in Table 5 have 
also been carried out for the models in Table 7 with the proportion of positive abnormal 
returns in lieu of the abnormal returns. The conclusions remained the same. To surmise, 
this indicates that the problem of fund share price inflation may have been accentuated by 
the adoption of the closing price as the mark-to-market criterion for stock funds. Even 
though there are more significant coefficients in this study, the conclusions are consistent 
with those in Sanematsu (2013).  
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Table 7 – Models with stock fund portfolio abnormal returns as the dependent variable and 





























Note. All variables and definitions of stock fund portfolios in top row in the Appendix. Coefficients are in 
percentage terms, i.e. a 1.0 coefficient represents an abnormal return of 1.0 percent. All stock fund 
portfolios are equally weighed. The value below the coefficients is the t-statistic computed with White robust 
standard errors. Abnormal returns relative to the Ibovespa index in the January 2004 through February 2013 
period. * and + indicate significance at the five and ten percent levels, respectively.   
 
4.5  Robustness checks  
Carhart et al. (2002) also tested abnormal US stock fund returns using as 
dependent variable the proportion of funds in each category that exhibit positive abnormal 
returns. This study executed these tests as well and obtained similar conclusions to those 
presented in the preceding section. The proportion of funds with positive abnormal returns 
is larger at the end of a period and smaller at the beginning of a period. These 
proportions of positive abnormal returns are more frequently significant at period ends 
when funds charge incentive fees and target the general public.  
Additional tests used dummies for two or three days before the last trading day of a 
calendar period instead of the last day dummy. Analogously, dummies for one, two or 
three days after the first trading day of a period were used instead of the first trading day 
dummy.  The negative and significant abnormal returns on the period ending days and the 
positive and significant returns in the next period beginning days were not observed. Thus, 
the evidence for the last trading day of a period and the first trading day of the next period 


















































































































































































































































R2 (%) 1.13 1.26 0.67 0.69 0.94 1.70 1.01 1.46 0.90 
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does not seem to extend to the preceding or following trading days, respectively. These 
robustness tests are not presented herein but are available with the authors.  
The period end considered in the previous analyses was the last trading day in the 
calendar period. However, many funds do not charge incentive fees on these days. In fact, 
23 of the 203 stock funds that charge incentive fees in the sample levy them every six 
months but on dates that do not coincide with the end of the calendar semester. Twelve 
funds charge the incentive fee once a year and two of them do not use the last day of the 
calendar to calculate the fee. One of the funds charges its incentive fee on a quarterly 
basis and two charge this fee monthly on the last trading day of the month. Thus 165 of 
the 203 funds (81 percent) charge an incentive fee every six months at the end of each 
calendar semester. Maybe the models that considered solely calendar semester-ends in 
Tables 5 and 6 did not capture the fund price share inflation properly. 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for abnormal returns and their positive 
proportion. The Appendix shows the definitions of the FEEDAY and AFTERFEE dummy 
variables. FEEDAY marks the day in which a fund charges incentive fees or the last day of 
a calendar semester for funds that do not charge an incentive fee. AFTERFEE marks the 
corresponding trading day after those marked by FEEDAY. Like the preceding evidence, 
the abnormal return for FEEDAY should be positive if fund managers try to inflate the fund 
share price. The abnormal returns for AFTERFEE, on the other hand, should be negative if 
fund managers need to reverse the positions taken to inflate the price of fund shares on 
the previous day.  
The FEEDAY average abnormal return is 6.0 basis points for all funds, 6.9 for 
operating, and 3.0 for discontinued funds in Panel A of Table 8. The abnormal return 
averages for the other days are 2.0, 3.0, and 0.02 basis points for all, operating, and 
discontinued funds, respectively. These averages for the other days are not in Table 8. The 
differences between average abnormal returns on AFTERFEE days and other days are 
significant for every fund portfolio. However, this is not always the case for the FEEDAY 
dummy. The absolute values of the average and median abnormal returns for FEEDAY are 
much lower than those for AFTERFEE. This suggests that attempts to inflate the fund share 
prices at FEEDAY may cost investors dearly.  
The proportion of positive abnormal returns is around 50 percent on the other days 
in the sample (those not market in FEEDAY or AFTERFEE). The proportion of positive 
abnormal returns for every fund portfolio is greater than 50 percent for FEEDAY in Panel A 
of Table 8. Exclusive funds (EXCL) register the lowest proportion of positive abnormal 
returns as well as the lowest average abnormal return for FEEDAY. Funds that target the 
general public (GEN) display the largest proportion of positive abnormal returns as well as 
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the highest average abnormal returns for FEEDAY, which is significantly greater than that 
of other trading days.  
This evidence confirms the previous conclusions that funds aimed at the general 
public may be more exposed to agency conflicts and that investors of exclusive funds are 
less exposed to this problem. The results for funds that charge incentive fees are consistent 
with previous conclusions as well. Even though the evidence in Panel A of Table 8 provides 
more information and statistical significance test than Sanematsu (2013), the conclusions 
herein are in line with those of that study.  
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Table 8 - Abnormal returns on actual incentive fee charge day  
 
Panel A: Whole sample period (January 2004 through February 2013)  
 
Portfolio Day dummy Average Median Prop. > 0 No. Obs. t(1) 
ALL FEEDAY 6.0 8.2 58.3 7503 3.6* 
OPER FEEDAY 6.9 9.1 58.1 5695 3.3* 
DISC FEEDAY 3.0 6.7 59.0 1808 1.5 
EXCL FEEDAY 2.8 5.3 53.7 2186 -0.1 
QUAL FEEDAY 6.4 10.5 59.0 982 0.7 
GEN FEEDAY 10.7 10.4 61.6 2527 5.7* 
MAN FEEDAY 6.1 8.3 58.6 2987 2.2* 
INC FEEDAY 9.4 10.3 57.8 2014 2.9* 
NOFEE FEEDAY 3.2 7.4 56.9 694 -0.4 
ALL AFTERFEE -42.5 -25.0 33.5 7504 -35.1* 
OPER AFTERFEE -49.4 -33.2 30.4 5694 -37.0* 
DISC AFTERFEE -20.7 -7.1 43.3 1810 -7.5* 
EXCL AFTERFEE -57.3 -46.0 27.0 2187 -23.9* 
QUAL AFTERFEE -56.3 -41.0 29.7 980 -16.5* 
GEN AFTERFEE -39.9 -21.1 33.6 2527 -23.2* 
MAN AFTERFEE -45.1 -28.2 31.5 2989 -25.5* 
INC AFTERFEE -53.3 -39.1 29.3 2011 -22.6* 
NOFEE AFTERFEE -56.7 -38.2 28.7 694 -14.5* 
 
Panel B: Period before the mark-to-market rule change (until May 2008)  
Portfolio Day dummy Average Median Prop. > 0 No. Obs. t(1) 
ALL FEEDAY 5.3 6.7 59.0 1968 3.2* 
OPER FEEDAY 11.0 9.1 61.6 1132 4.8* 
DISC FEEDAY -2.5 3.8 55.5 836 -0.6 
EXCL FEEDAY 13.0 8.1 55.3 291 2.2* 
QUAL FEEDAY 12.0 8.7 62.2 193 2.5* 
GEN FEEDAY 9.8 10.1 64.2 648 3.8* 
MAN FEEDAY 14.0 11.0 64.4 592 3.8* 
INC FEEDAY 9.1 7.7 57.0 428 3.1* 
NOFEE FEEDAY 2.2 11.2 64.3 112 0.3 
ALL AFTERFEE -2.4 0.8 50.8 1965 -1.5 
OPER AFTERFEE -1.5 0.6 50.4 1129 -1.0 
DISC AFTERFEE -3.7 1.8 51.4 836 -1.1 
EXCL AFTERFEE -8.5 -7.3 45.5 292 -1.5 
QUAL AFTERFEE -3.4 0.9 50.8 191 -1.0 
GEN AFTERFEE 2.2 2.6 52.5 646 0.9 
MAN AFTERFEE 2.2 3.1 52.6 593 0.8 
INC AFTERFEE -5.9 -3.4 45.8 424 -2.4* 




Panel C: Period after the mark-to-market rule change (after May 2008)  
 
Portfolio Day dummy Average Median Prop. > 0 No. Obs. t(1) t(2) 
ALL FEEDAY 6.2 9.4 58.1 5535 2.5* 0.5 
OPER FEEDAY 5.9 9.1 57.3 4563 1.6 -1.9+ 
DISC FEEDAY 7.7 10.9 61.9 972 2.5* 2.7* 
EXCL FEEDAY 1.2 5.0 53.5 1895 -1.0 -1.8+ 
QUAL FEEDAY 5.1 11.4 58.2 789 0.0 -1.2 
GEN FEEDAY 11.0 10.4 60.7 1879 4.5* 0.4 
MAN FEEDAY 4.1 7.7 57.2 2395 0. -2.4* 
INC FEEDAY 9.5 12.0 58.0 1586 2.2* 0.1 
NOFEE FEEDAY 3.4 7.0 55.5 582 -0.5 0.2 
ALL AFTERFEE -56.7 -40.8 27.3 5539 -37.4* -25.0* 
OPER AFTERFEE -61.3 -47.7 25.4 4565 -39.0* -24.6* 
DISC AFTERFEE -35.3 -16.6 36.2 974 -7.8* -6.0* 
EXCL AFTERFEE -64.9 -54.6 24.2 1895 -24.8* -9.6* 
QUAL AFTERFEE -69.1 -56.3 24.6 789 -17.2* -11.1* 
GEN AFTERFEE -54.4 -37.5 27.1 1881 -25.1* -20.2* 
MAN AFTERFEE -56.8 -42.0 26.3 2396 -27.6* -17.5* 
INC AFTERFEE -66.0 -52.1 24.9 1587 -23.3* -15.0* 
NOFEE AFTERFEE -66.9 -49.1 23.4 582 -15.1* -8.5* 
 
Note. Average and median values are in basis points, i.e. 1.0 represents 0.01 percent or one basis point.  
All portfolios are equally weighted. Proportions of positive abnormal returns ("Prop. > 0") are in percentage 
form. Abnormal returns are taken relative to the Ibovespa index. Portfolios and day dummies are defined in 
the Appendix. The t-statistic (1) is for the difference between the average abnormal return for a portfolio on 
FEEDAY or AFTERFEE trading days and the average abnormal returns on the other trading days of the 
sample. The t-statistic (2) in Panel C is for the difference between the average abnormal returns in Panel C 
(after the rule change) and in Panel B (before the rule change). * and + indicate significance at the five and 
ten percent levels, respectively.  
 
Panels B and C of Table 8 present descriptive statistics for stock funds abnormal 
returns similar to those in Panel A. Panel B shows the results for the period when mark-to-
market was performed using the average price and Panel C from the month the closing 
price should be used.  
The FEEDAY abnormal returns are more often significantly greater than those in the 
other days before the rule change. The average abnormal returns for portfolios of funds 
that target the general public or charge incentive fees are significantly greater for FEEDAY 
than in other days both before and after the rule change. The FEEDAY abnormal returns 
are significantly greater for discontinued funds after the rule change while funds that do 
not charge an incentive fee displayed a significant reduction in abnormal returns.  
There is a remarkable difference between the AFTERFEE returns before and after 
the rule change. Average and median daily abnormal returns are significantly different and 
greater in absolute terms after the adoption of the closing price rule for all portfolios. This 
result for the day after the incentive fee was charged suggests that fund share price 
inflation attempts may have accentuated after the introduction of the new rule, maybe 
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through more risk taking or trading in less liquid stocks, and the reversals of these attempts 
may have caused more severe losses to investors.  
The evidence in Panels B and C of Table 8 indicate that attempts to inflate the 
share price of the fund on the last day of the period have not been curbed with the rule 
change. Inflation attempts did not generate better returns for managers at period ends 
after the rule change, but investors were worse off because the negative abnormal returns 
on the following day increased in absolute terms after the adoption of the closing price 
rule.   
 
5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Disregarding discontinued funds may lead to overestimation of the average stock 
fund performance. The equally weighted average annual return of surviving Brazilian stock 
funds is nearly two percentage points greater than a sample with surviving and 
discontinued funds between January 2004 and February 2013. This figure drops to little 
over one percent for the AUM weighted average stock fund return, suggesting that the 
AUM of discontinued stock funds was smaller. The difference in performance, nonetheless, 
was not statistically significant in every sample year. This suggests that other factors may 
inhibit performance besides survivorship, such as fund longevity and association to large 
financial conglomerates that predominantly cater to the general banking clientele. 
Mendonça et al. (2016) argue that younger funds or those run by independent asset 
managers that target qualified investors tend to perform better.   
Brazilian stock funds do not seem to be immune to agency conflicts, but this may 
be attenuated when investors have a greater capacity to monitor fund managers. Stock 
funds that target the general public exhibit a greater incidence of abnormal returns around 
the end of calendar months or semesters than exclusive funds and non-exclusive funds for 
qualified investors. It is possible that fund managers try to inflate the share price of funds 
particularly on the days they charge fees. This evidence is consistent with the findings in 
Sanematsu (2013).  
The charge of incentive fees may encourage fund managers to try to inflate the 
price of fund shares in order to obtain a larger compensation. There is a greater frequency 
in the occurrence of significant abnormal returns for funds that charge an incentive fee. 
The incidence of significant abnormal returns is even greater for stock funds that target the 
general public and charge an incentive fee. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture 
that the deleterious effects of agency conflicts may be more severe in stock funds that 
charge more for management compensation and are monitored by investors from the 
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general public. A stricter regulation for the charge of incentive fees in funds that target the 
general public may help protecting these investors but will not eliminate the practice of 
inflating fund share prices entirely.  
The introduction of the closing price instead of the average price as the fund mark-
to-market criterion in May 2008 may have accentuated the problem. The results indicate 
that the problem is more serious on the day following the end of the period, when negative 
abnormal returns increased in absolute terms after the adoption of the closing price. Even 
so the results do not show conclusively that the practice of inflating fund share prices 
became more widespread with the adoption of the new mark-to-market criterion, investor 
losses on the day after the end of the period increased substantially after the adoption of 
the closing price rule, since managers may need to reverse the transactions that tried to 
inflate the fund share price on the previous day. In general, the conclusions herein support 
those in Sanematsu (2013), who did not consider all the information about discontinued 
funds, did not distinguish between exclusive and non-exclusive funds, and included very 
small funds for a slightly shorter sample period.   
A limitation of this study is that it was not possible to analyze discontinued funds in 
terms of their clientele or fee types. Only historical daily fund share prices and net asset 
values were available for these funds. This study could not examine daily portfolio 
composition on dates close to period ends. The Brazilian Securities Commission has 
portfolio composition data solely for the last trading day of the month. Maybe it would be 
possible to ascertain whether the goal of fund trades on the last days of a period was to 
inflate fund share prices temporarily if daily portfolio compositions were available. This 
study does not examine stock data on the last days of periods and on subsequent days, 
such as prices, trading volume, institutional shareholding, among others. The analysis of 
this data may be explored in future studies to improve the understanding of fund abnormal 
returns at period ends.  
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S1END (S1BEG)  Equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of the first semester of the 
calendar year and 0 otherwise. 
S2END (S2BEG)  Equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of the second semester of the 
calendar year and 0 otherwise. 
SEND (SBEG)  Equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of a semester of the calendar 
year and 0 otherwise. 
MEND (MBEG) Equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of the months that are not 
semester ends (beginnings) in the calendar year and 0 otherwise. 
END (BEG) Equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of any month in the calendar 
year and 0 otherwise. 
FEEDAY (AFTERFEE) Equal to 1 on the day (day after) a fund computed the incentive fee or 
equal to 1 on the last (first) trading day of a semester of the calendar 
year for funds that do not charge incentive fees and 0 otherwise.  
END*CL (BEG*CL) Interaction between the binary variable END (BEG) with a binary 
variable that is equal to 1 for every day in the period after the mark-to-
market rule change and zero otherwise. 
ALL Portfolio of stock funds with all stock funds in the sample, including 
operating and discontinued funds, except very small funds (those 
whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million throughout the sample 
period) 
OPER Portfolio of stock funds in operation at the end of the sample period, 
except very small funds (those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million 
throughout the sample period) 
DISC Portfolio of stock funds discontinued during the sample period, except 
very small funds (those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million 
throughout the sample period) 
MAN Portfolio of stock funds in operation at the end of the sample period 
that only charge a management fee, except very small funds (those 
whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million throughout the sample 
period) 
INC Portfolio of stock funds in operation at the end of the sample period 
that charge a management and an incentive fee, except very small 
funds (those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million throughout the 
sample period) 
NOFEE Portfolio of stock funds in operation at the end of the sample period 
that do not charge fees, except very small funds (those whose AUM 
was less than US$ 5 million throughout the sample period) 
EXCL Portfolio of exclusive stock funds in operation at the end of the sample 
period, except very small funds (those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 
million throughout the sample period) 
QUAL Portfolio of non-exclusive stock funds in operation targeted to qualified 
investors at the end of the sample period, except very small funds 
(those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million throughout the sample 
period) 
GEN Portfolio of non-exclusive stock funds in operation targeted to the 
general public at the end of the sample period, except very small funds 
(those whose AUM was less than US$ 5 million throughout the sample 
period)  
 

